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During this period the 'medieval principles which regulated this
branch of the law were worked out in considerable detail. The largest
part of the law still centered round the boroughs and various ecclesiasti-
cal corporations sole or aggregate. But hospitals1 and colleges had
begun to increase; and, at the end of this period, commercial corpora-
tions were assuming a position of great importance. They would have
continued to increase more rapidly, and, in consequence, the law on this
topic would have developed much more quickly, had not the legisla-
ture, as a result of the episode of the 'South Sea Bubble,' deliberately
made the assumption of corporate form by these societies difficult.
2
In fact the law developed during this period very much on medieval
lines. I shall consider its development under the following heads:
the Creation of Incorporate Persons; their Powers, Capacities and Lia-
bilities; their Dissolution; and the Nature of Corporate Personality.
THE CREATION OF INCORPORATE PERSONS
The rules as to the creation of the incorporate person had been ascer-
tained in the medieval period.3 Coke summed up the medieval rules
and laid down the modem rule, when in the Case of Sutton's Hospital
he stated that the first essential for a vital corporation was a "lawful
authority of incorporation," and explained this to mean that a corpora-
tion must be created either by the common law, by authority of Parlia-
ment, by royal charter, or by prescription.4 To this we must add that,
"The legal sense of the word hospital is a corporate foundation, endowed for
the perpetual distribution of the founder's charity, in the lodging and maintenance
of a certain number of poor persons, according to the regulations and statutes of
the founder. Such institutions are not necessarily connected with medicine or
surgery, and in their original establishment had no necessary reference to sickness
or accident," Grant, Corporations (ed. 185o) 567; as is there pointed out they
did not differ very materially from colleges; in the case of the college education
of poor persons was the main object, and in the case of the hospital their mainte-
nance. Ibid.
' See an article by the present writer (1916) 28 ScoT. JuRiD. RFV. 343.
33 Holdsworth, History of English Law (i9o9) 373.
"Lawful authority of incorporation; and that may be by four means, sc. by the
common law, as the King himself, etc.; by authority of Parliament; by the
King's charter (as in this case) ; and by prescription," Case of Siuttol's Hospital
(1613, K. B.) io Co. Rep. ia, 29b.
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as in the medieval period, a corporation for a limited purpose could be
created by implication.'
The need for the sanction of the state for the creation of a corpora-
tion was steadily adhered to in this period, and it has never been aban-
doned. It was adhered to on those grounds of public policy which I
have elsewhere explained;6 and their existence is assumed in all the
cases of this period. Perhaps the earliest case in which they are
explicitly stated is the case of the quo warranto proceedings against the
City of London in 1682.7 Sir Robert Sawyer, the Attorney-General,
was arguing that corporations which abused their power could be seized
into the king's hands. If, he said, it were impossible to proceed thus
against corporations, and to punish them for their misdeeds, "it were
to set up independent commonwealths within the kingdom and (this)
• . . would certainly tend to the utter overthrow of the common law,
and the crown too, in which all sovereign power to do right both to itself
and the subjects, is only lodged by the common law of this realm."" A
mere permission to aggrieved individuals to sue the corporation would
be of little avail "whilst the cause still remains and is in as great power to
oppress as before." Indeed "the law would be deficient if such inferidr
jurisdictions, or corporations, were not subject to the common law upon
the like conditions, as other liberties, franchises and inferior juris-
dictions are."
That is really the gist of the matter. The same reasons which make
it necessary for the law to recognize the crime of conspiracy, make it
necessary to regulate these groups of men who, when they act in com-
bination, have far more power for good or evil than any single man.
The failure to recognize this principle in the case of the trade union,
and the abandonment by the state of any control over their activities,
have shown that Sir Robert Sawyer was a true prophet; - for the
abandonment by the state of its sovereignty has in effect set up a new
feudalism which is every bit as retrogressive in its ideas and as mis-
chievous as the feudalism of the Middle Ages. Our modem experience
is a striking illustration of the political wisdom of the Roman lawyers
when they taught the expediency of "keeping the corporate form under
lock and key." In fact creation by and subordination to the state are
the only terms upon which the existence of large associations of men
can be safely allowed to lead an active life.
It is, it is true, a favorite theory among our modem teachers of
jurisprudence that the life of these associations of .men is a real living
5Altony mous (1553, Q. B.) i Dyer, ioo a.
63 Holdsworth, op. cit. 373-5.
7 (1682, K. B.) 8 S. T. io39.
'Ibid. 1178.
'Maitland, Gierke on Political Theories of the Middle Age (igoo) xxx.
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thing quite independent of the permission to exist as an incorporate
person given to them by the state; and a survey of the various groups
which flourished in the Middle Ages, a consideration of the great free-
dom with which groups may incorporate themselves at the present day,
may lead to the view that these incorporate groups have, and always
have had, a life of their own, independent of the sovereign state, just
as the custom which is at the back of law is independent of the com-
mand of the sovereign. The practical inference sometimes drawn
seems to be that the law should recognize the personality of all such
groups. But it is obviously inexpedient to limit unduly the sovereign's
power to impose conditions upon such recognition. The sovereign may
be willing to recognise many various groups, just as he may be willing
to recognise as law many reasonable customs. But a civilized state
cannot dispense either with the need for that recognition or with the
power to impose conditions, any more than it can dispense with some
test as to the reasonableness of the customs which it admits as laws.
The somewhat anarchic theory that the sanction of the state could or
should be dispensed with, has gained more favor in Germany and other
continental countries than in England, because the attainment of cor-
porate form was, as Maitland has shown, more eagerly desired in coun-
tries which had not the expedient of the trust.10 Much can be done
under cover of a trust without the necessity of a grant of incorporation.
And though it has been necessary to control the formation of these
trusts in certain respects, a greater liberty of forming them can more
safely be allowed than a large unregulated liberty of association,
because the capacity for action of a group of men, who depend for their
life upon a body of trustees acting under a trust deed which defines and
stereotypes their powers, is far more limited both for good and evil
than the capacity for action of an incorporate person.
Corporate life and form therefore cannot exist without the permis-
sion of the state, express, presumed, or implied. But the incidents of
the continuance of that life are not equally dependent on the state.
An Act of Parliament can of course do anything; so that it can give
a corporation powers which, without such a sanction, would infringe the
principles of the common law; or it can vary its powers, or dissolve it at
pleasure. But it was well recognized in the seventeenth century that
0 "Behind the screen of trustees, and concealed from the direct scrutiny of legal
theories, all manner of groups can flourish: Lincoln's Inn or Lloyd's or the Stock
Exchange or the Jockey Club, a whole presbyterian system, or even the Church
of Rome with the Pope at its head. But, if we arekto visit a land where Roman
law has been 'received,' we must leave this great loose 'trust concept' at the
Custom House, and must not for a moment suppose that a meagre fidei commissurm
will serve in its stead. Then we shall understand how vitally important to a
nation-socially, politically, religiously important-its Theory of Corporations
might be." Maitland, op. cit. xxix, xxx.
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the law cannot be changed by royal charter,'1 so that a charter which
purported to give a corporation powers which infringed the principles
of the common law would be void.12 It would seem, for instance, that
a charter which permitted a corporation to deprive at will any of the
corporators of his freehold rights in the corporation would be void; 13
and it was held after the Revolution that new charters granted after an
attempted surrender of the old charter which could not take legal effect,
were void. 4 It would seem, too, that the king could not at his pleasure
vary the rights of those upon whom he had conferred privileges by his
charter,'15 nor could he dissolve the corporation which he had created.' 6
These principles are clearly the consequence of the definition of the
constitutional position of the king in the state. Obviously they made
for the independence of the corporate life which these incorporate per-
sons enjoyed, just as they made for the freedom of the natural persons
who were the subjects of the state. We shall see in the following sec-
tion that they have had some influence on the character of the powers,
capacities, and liabilities which the law attributed to them.
POWERS, CAPACITIES, AND LIABILITIES
In the Middle Ages the lawyers were beginning to deduce from the
nature of corporate personality certain conclusions as to the powers,
capacities, and liabilities of corporations.' 7 This process was pursued
during this period; and, in consequence, we find certain rules laid
down as to activities from which the nature of that personality debarred
corporations, and as to activities which were naturally incident to cor-
porate life. But we shall see that, though it is possible to say that the
nature of corporate personality debars corporations from certain activi-
ties, it is difficult to draw the line in particular cases; and from that time
to this there has been considerable fluctuation of opinion as to whether
or no certain activities are or are not permissible. Similarly there has
been considerable difficulty in determining what activities are or are
not incident to corporate life; and, in the evolution of the law on this
matter, the disturbing influence of semi-political considerations may
be suspected. Most corporations at this period Were created by royal
""The king cannot by his charter alter the law." Anthony Lowe's Case (16io,
K. B.) 9 Co. Rep. 122b, 123a.
' In the Middle Ages this principle had been applied to a charter which, it was
alleged, had infringed a statute. Select Cases before the Council (s. s.) 6I, 62,
66, 68, 69.
"3See Warren's Case (1620, K. B.) Cro. Jac. 540; Grant, Corporations (ed.
,850) 22.
"Piper v. Dennis (1692, K. B.) Holt, 17o; Grant, op. Ct. 21-2.
1 City of London's Case (I6io, K. B.) 8 Co. Rep. 121b, 126b, citing a record
of 32 Edw. III.
"Hayward v. Fulcher (1624, K. B.) Palmar, 491, 501, per Whitlock, J.
1T3 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 369-71.
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charter; and, as we have seen, 8 to allow a royal charter to vary the
incidents annexed by the common law to corporate capacities appeared
to contravene the principle that a royal charter cannot change the law.
Hence there was a tendency to define corporate powers and capacities
somewhat rigidly, and to deny that the crown could limit the powers
naturally incident to a corporation. But it was obviously desirable to
maintain some measure of control over corporate activities. This fact
was recognized by the law; and it soon became apparent that, as the
purposes for which corporations were formed were very various, it
was hardly possible to maintain that all corporations created by royal
charter must have the same powers and capacities. Hence, in addition
to older modes of controlling corporate activities, we begin to see the
beginnings of a limitation on these activities based upon the purposes
for which a corporation is created-a limitation which, in later law, will
assume enormous importance. Though it may not be within the com-
petence of the crown to change the incidents annexed by law to cor-
porate personality, it is competent to the crown to define the purposes
for which a corporation is created; and if the corporation tries to effect
purposes other than those for which it was created, its acts will be
ultra vires and void.
I shall therefore deal with the history of this subject under the fol-
lowing three heads :-(i) activities impossible to a corporation; (2)
powers and capacities incident to a corporation; and (3) limitations on
the powers and capacities incident to a corporation.
(i) Activities Impossible to a Corporation. The deductions which
the medieval lawyers had drawn from the nature of corporate person-
ality as to the activities which were impossible to a corporation were
summed up by Coke in the Case of Sutton's Hospital,"9 and passed on
into modern law.
"A corporation aggregate of many," he said "is invisible, immortal,
and rests only in intendment and consideration of law; and therefore a
dean and chapter cannot have predecessor nor successor. They can-
not commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they have
no souls, neither can they appear in person, but by attorney. A corpo-
ration aggregate of many cannot do fealty, for an invisible body can
neither be ih person nor swear. It is not subject to imbecilities, death
of the natural body, and divers other cases." 20  I
So in 1682 it was said by counsel arguing for the corporation of
London that a corporation "is but a name, an ens rationis, a thing that
cannot be seen, and is no substance." 2' It followed that it could not
a'Supra, at p. 383. (x613, K. B.) io Co. Rep. Ia.
"Case of Sutton's Hospital, supra, at p. 32b.; cf. Bezvi's Case (1575, Q. B.)
4 Co. Rep. 8a, iha; Coke, Littleton, 66b.
'Proceedings between the King and the City of London (1682, K. B.) 8 S. T.
.J039, 1,37.
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either do or suffer a personal wrong, so that it could not commit or
suffer a battery; nor could it have a traitorous or a felonious mind, so
that it could not commit treason or felony.22  In the eighteenth century
Blackstone summarized the list of the disabilities of a corporation
deduced from the nature of its corporate personality to be found in
the older authorities ;23 and in 1915 substantially the same views were
expressed by Lord Wrenbury. "The artificial legal person called the
corporation," he said, "has no physical existence. It exists only in con-
templation of law. It has neither body, parts, nor passions. It cannot
wear weapons nor serve in the wars. It can be neither loyal nor dis-
loyal. It cannot compass 'treason. It can be neither friend nor
enemy. '
'2 4
But it is one thing to draw abstract deductions from the nature of
corporate personality as to the powers and capacities and liabilities of a
corporation; it is another thing to translate these deductions into con-
crete rules. If they were pushed to their logical conclusions, it would
follow that a corporation could not as a corporation be held liable
for tort or crime. This consequence followed from the arguments
addressed to the court on behalf of the City of London in 1682.25 But
the court was swift to reject it,26 and in effect held that a corpora-
tion could be guilty'of a seditious libel and other misdemeanors.27 In
more modem times the courts have held a corporation liable even for
malicious torts committed in the course of acts which are within the
scope of the powers of a corporation.2 8  No doubt the theoretical diffi-
culties of imputing malice to a corporation which were felt by some
judges29 and given effect to in some decisions of the nineteenth cen-
"Ibid. 1137-8. Zi Blackstone, Commentaries, *476-7.
"Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Daimler [i915, C. A.] i K. B. 893, 916.
See Proceedings between the King and the City of London, supra note 21,
at pp. 1,37-40.
" "That bodies politic may offend and be pardoned appears by the general article
of pardon, 12 Car. 2, whereby corporations are pardoned all crimes and offences.
And the Act for regulating corporations, 13 Car. 2, which provides that no cor-
poration shall be avoided for anything by them misdone or omitted to be done,
shows also that their charters may be avoided for things by them misdone, or
omitted to be done. Ibid. 1266-8.
"As Sir F. Pollock says: "Treby's interest, of course, was to suggest every
possible objection, technical as well as substantial, to penal proceedings against a
corporation. The King's advisers, on the other hand, were prepared to go very
far in ascribing both wrongful acts and wrongful intention to a corporate body,
for they charged the City of London with a malicious and seditious libel. No
general inference can be drawn except that there was no settled rule either way to
prevent either argument from being plausible." Pollock, Theory of Corporations
in Common Law (191I) 27 L. QUART. REV. 218, 231-2.
"Barwick v- English Joint Stock Bank (1867) L. R. 2 Exch. 259; Citizejs
Life Assurance Co. v. Brozn [I9O4, P. C.] A. C. 423, 426, per Lord Lindley.
"See e.g. Lord Bramwell's judgment in Abrath v. N. B. Ry. (1886, H. L.)
L. R. ii A. C. 247, 25o-4.
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tury,30 have been slurred over by the modem doctrine of an employer's
liability for the torts of his agent.31 The human agent can be guilty
of malice; and, if he acting in the course of his employment, there is
no reason why his master should escape liability for his acts because he
is a corporation. s2 It would thus seem that so far as criminal or civil
liability is concerned the courts have always been prepared to hold that
a corporation is as capable of being held liable as a natural person.
It is true that it cannot be punished in the same way as a natural person.
It cannot be corporally punished; but its liability can be brought home
to it in a manner which is appropriate to such a person. As we shall
see it can be dissolved or suspended ;s3 and, as the cases show, it could
always be made to pay compensation for the trespasses, 34 and in our
modem law even for the malicious torts 5 committed by it through its
agents.
The manner in which the law has dealt with the liability of a corpora-
tion for wrongdoing is typical of the manner in which it has reconciled
the incapacities of a corporation which flow from the conception of
corporate personality with considerations of practical convenience. At
an earlier period in the history of the law, when as yet the idea of a
corporation vas new, the lawyers were inclined to lay more stress upon
wide general deductions from the nature of corporate personality.
Thus they said that a corporation could not be seised to a use,"' either
because a corporation had no conscience or because the process of the
Court of Chancery could not issue against it,7 or because it'had no
'0 See e. g. Stevens v. Midland Counties Ry. (1854) io Exch. 352, 356, per
Alderson, B.; Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie (1867) L. R. I Sc. & Div.
145, 167, per Lord Cranworth.
Note e. g. that in Stevens v. Midland Counties Ry., supra, at pp. 356-7 Platt, B.,
thought that a corporation would be responsible for a malicious act of its servant
which it had authorized.
' As Sir F. Pollock has said: As for the question, 'strum universitas deli-.
quere possit,' our modem way has been to circumvent it. The real difficulty was
to make out how any man, any natural man, could be vicariously liable to pay
damages for the wrongful act or negligence of his servant, which he had in no
way authorized and might even have expressly forbidden. When this was over-
come, the difficulty of ascribing wrongful intention to an artificial person was in
truth only a residue of anthropomorphic imagination." Pollock, op. cit. 27 L.
QuART. REV. at p. 235.
'Infra, at p. 402-403.
3 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 370.
Supra, at p. 387.
Fuhnerston v. Steward (1554, K. B.) Plowden, iO2, 1O3; Chudleigh's Case
(1589-95, K. B.) i Co. Rep. 113a, i22a; cf. Sanders, Uses (5th ed. 1844) ii 27 n.
S"It was said that no corporation can be seised to a use, for none can have
confidence committed to him but a body natural, who hath reason and is capable of
confidence, and may be compelled by imprisonment by order of the Chancellor of
England to perform the confidence, for that is the way the party shall take to
have it performed, and no corporation which consists of many can be imprispned,
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capacity to take to another's use ;38 and Blackstone stated that it could
not be a trustee. 9 Because it could hold only in its corporate capacity
f or the purposes of the corporation, it was said that a gift to a corpora-
tion and another person or another corporation jointly would create,
not a joint tenancy, but a tenancy in common; for in such a case the
two co-owners held in different capacities. 40 No doubt these were
legitimate deductions from the vague and wide premises on which they
were founded. But they were found to be inconvenient in practice.
And so, on grounds of practical convenience, they have been evaded or
altered. Equity, contrary to Blackstone's dictum, found no difficulty
in ruling that a corporation could be a trustee,4' and the legislature has
recently enabled a corporation to hold jointly with another person or
corporation.4 2
In fact, though these wide deductions drawn from the nature of
corporate personality have called attention to salient incapacities of cor-
porations as compared with natural persons, they have never been able
to stand any severe strain. Practical convenience rather than theoreti-
cal considerations have, from the days of the Year Books onward,
determined what activities are possible and what are impossible to a
corporation. And because the law has always followed this course it
was the more possible in these last days, in the supposed interests of
national defence, to sacrifice the central doctrine of corporation law-
the distinction between the corporation and its members-in order to
affect a British corporation with the consequences of possessing an
enemy character.4 3 No doubt there is Year Book authority for the
proposition that matters affecting individual corporators may affect the
validity of corporate acts;" but this goes far beyond these decisions.
Here we need only note, that, historically, the fact that such a decision
was possible illustrates the comparatively small importance which doc-
trines derived from the nature of corporate personality have had on the
law as to what activities are impossible to a corporation. We shall see
and their natural body shall not be imprisoned for the offence of their body
corporate, which is another body." Croft v. Howel (578, K. B.) Plowden, 53o,
538.
'Abbot of Bury v. Bokenham (537, K. B.) i Dyer, 7b, 8b.
=i Blackstone, Commentaries, *477.
" Littleton, Tenures, sec. 296; Coke, Littleton, *i89b, *i9oa.
'See Attorney-General v. Landerfield (z744, Ch.) 9 Mod. 286, where the
Chancellor said that "nothing was clearer than that corporations might be trustees."
"(i899) 62 & 63 Vict. c. 20.
"Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. [I916, H. L.] 2 A. C. 307; at
p. 344 Lord Parker said: "The truth is that considerations which govern civil
liability and rights of property in time of peace differ radically from those which
govern enemy character in time of war."
'43 Holdsworth, op. cit. 369, note 7; Pollock, op. cit. 27 L. QuART. REv. at p.
234, 235.
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later that this decision has also some bearing on the theory or want of
theory as to the nature of that personality which has always been a char-
acteristic feature of English law.45 But at this point we must turn
from the consideration of the things which a corporation cannot do to
the things which it can. Here too we shall see that the wide general
rules with which the law started have been modified to meet practical
needs.
(2) Powers and Capacities Incident to a Corporation. Already in
the Middle Ages the lawyers were coming to the conclusion that cer-
tain powers and capacities were incident to a corporation. It was
assumed in 148146 that a corporation could take a grant of property or
franchise, for that was the purpose for which the corporation had been
created; and Fitzherbert, in abridging this case, laid it down that if a
corporation were created it had by implication the capacity to sue and to
be sued.47  Coke, improving upon these authorities, laid it down that
other powers and capacities belonged to a corporation by necessary
implication. For instance the power to acquire or alienate property, and
to have a seal, and the right of the survivors to succeed to the corporate
property-were all incident to a corporation.48  Further, other powers
might be given to a corporation, which were necessary to enable it to
carry out the purposes for which it was created. Thus it might be
given the power to acquire lands in mortmain, or to make by-laws for
the better carrying out of the purposes for which the corporation was
created.49 Blackstone, while admitting that there were distinctions
between corporations sole and corporations aggregate, and between
ecclesiastical and eleemosynary corporations and others,50 lays it down
that to every corporation aggregate there is inseparably annexed as of
course the following five incidents: i. To have perpetual succession.
2. To sue or be sued, implead or be impleaded, grant or receive, by its
corporate name, and do all other acts as natural persons may. 3. To
purchase lands and hold them, for the benefit of themselves and their
successors. 4. To have a common seal. 5. To make by-laws or pri-
"In Ifra, at p. 407.
48 Y. B. 21 Edw. IV, p. 55, pl. 28.
' Fitzherbert, Abr. Grant, pl. 30 where he makes Brian and Choke say: "que
le roy puit faire corporacion sauns rien reserver ou riens dire que il serra pled ou
empleder quar le si le roye graunte a moye licens de fayre une chaunterye pour
une prest chaunterye en certeyne lieu et doner a luy et ces successours certeyne
terre al value de certeine somme, et jeo face, issint il est bone corporacion sauns
pluis parolm et sauns riens reserver etc."
"Case of Sutton's Hospital (1613, K. B.) io Co. Rep. ia, 3ob; as Sir F.
Pollock says: "Coke appears to go a little beyond Fitzherbert, and Fitzherbert a
little beyond the book at large." Pollock, op. cit. 27 L. QuART. REV. at p. 229.




vate statutes for the better government of the corporation, which are
binding upon themselves unless contrary to the laws of the land. 1
It was settled before the sixteenth century5 2 and recognized in that
century53 that any of the powers belonging to a corporation could be
exercised by a majority of the corporators-a principle which an Act of
1541-2 enforced on corporations notwithstanding any directions to the
contrary contained in their foundation statutes.54 Similarly. the
medieval rule that an act of the corporation must be under the corpora-
tion seal,55 and the medieval exceptions to that rule5 6 were recognized
and reasserted; and it was laid down at the end of the seventeenth
century that the seal must be affixed by the proper officer,57 and that
the seal was not needed for acts which, being matters of record, the
corporation was estopped from denying.5"
All these powers, whether incident or not to a corporation, were
giving rise to a large mass of case law. With the detailed rules which
resulted we are not here concerned. But we are concerned with the
manner in which the law regarded these powers, as it has a considerable
bearing upon the view which the law took of corporate powers
generally.
It would seem that, just as the law regarded certain powers and
capacities to be impossible to a corporation owing to the nature of its
corporate personality, so it regarded certain powers and capacities as
incident to that personality, and as inseparably annexed to it as to a
natural person. This view of the nature of corporate capacities had
not emerged in the Middle Ages. It was said, it is true, that a power to
sue or be sued was naturally incident to a corporation; and it was
assumed that a power to hold property or make contracts was also
Ibid. *475-6.
r (1481) Y. B. 21 Edw. IV, p. 67, 70, pl. 53.
'See the Chamberlain of London's Case (591, K. B.) 5 Co. Rep. 62b, 63a;
cf. Regina v. Bailiffs of Ipswich (17o6, Q. B.) 2 Salk. 434, 435; Grant, Corpora-
tions, 68.
33 Henry VIII, c. 27-a necessary act for avoiding questions as to the validity
of the surrenders of the monastic property.
53 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 370; Grant, op. cit. 55, and cases
there cited.
"But the authority on this matter is scanty; besides the Y.BB. cases, see 3
Holdsworth, op. cit. 370-1. Grant, op. cit. 62 only cites Randle v. Dean (1701,
C. P.) 2 Lut. 1496, which has not much bearing on the matter, and Blackstone
does not mention these exceptions in his treatment of .the subject in Bk. i; but
the exception seems to have been recognized in Cary v. Matthews (1688, Exch.
Ch.) I Salk. 191. It had got into the Abridgments, and as Grant points out, it
was revived and given its modem importance by the decisions of the nineteenth
century.
" Anonymous (,702, K. B.) 12 Mod. 423, per Holt, C. J.
'Mayor of Thetford's Case (1702, Q. B.) I Salk. i92-"The reason is,
because they are estopped by the record to say it is not their act."
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naturally incident. But it was not till the sixteenth century that these
and the like powers were said to be inseparably annexed and therefore
tacitly incident to all corporations. We may perhaps suspect that the
analogy of developments of the law relating to the prerogative has had
some influence. Talk about inseparable prerogatives was very much
in the air; the King had been endowed with a corporate capacity; the
law had, as we have seen; already drawn the conclusion that certain
activities were impossible to a corporation, and that certain capacities
were obviously and naturally incident to it-was it not therefore natural
to argue that these capacities were not only naturally incident to a cor-
poration, but as inseparable as similar capacities were to a natural man?
And another consideration of a semi-constitutional kind no doubt helped
the judges to come to this conclusion. It was well recognized that the
king's charter could neither change the common law nor alter the rights
and duties of private persons as fixed by law.5 To hold, therefore,
that the king could neither give nor take away powers from a corpora-
tion which he could not give or take away from a natural man was
quite in accordance with this constitutional doctrine.60 But, if this
were so, it followed that these powers and capacities were not only
incident, they were also inseparably annexed to a corporation. The
result was that any attempt on the part of the crown to restrict these
powers could have no legal effect.
This doctrine and its practical results are clearly expressed in the
following passage in the Case of Sutton's Hospital:6
"When a corporation is duly created all other incidents are tacit
annexed . . . and therefore divers clauses subsequent in the charters
are not of necessity, but only declaratory, and might well have been
left out. As i. By the same to have authority, ability, and capacity to
purchase, but no clause is added that they may alien, etc. and it need
not, for it is incident. 2. To sue and be sued, implead and be
impleaded. 3. To have a seal, etc., that is also declaratory, .. .. 4. To
restrain them from aliening or devising but in a certain form; that is
an ordinance testifying the King's desire, but it is but a precept, and
doth not bind in law."
This principle was according to Lord Raymond's report, partially at
'See The Prince's Case (16o6, Ch.) 8 Co. Rep. Ia, i6b; see also supra note
12, at p. 385.
'Cf. Pollock, op. cit. 7 L. QUART. REV. at p. 23o.
1t (1613, K. B.) io Co. Rep. Ia, 3ob. On this question see Carden, Limitations
on the Powers of Common Law Corporations (191o) 26 L. QuART. REv. 320,
which contains a very full and suggestive account of the evolution of the law on
this matter.
"There are two sorts of corporations. The one constituted for public govern-
"ment, the other for private charity. The first being duly created, although there
are no words in their creation, for enabling their members to purchase, implead,
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any rate accepted by Holt, C. J., in 1694 ;62 and the same view is stated
even more strongly by Blackstone.
6 3
Now it is clear that this doctrine gives to corporations great liberty of
action. It means, for instance, that they have the same free power to
alienate real and personal property as a natural person; and this conse-
quence has, in spite of adverse criticism of the rule as to free alienation
of realty,64 been admitted by the courts. 5  Similarly they have the same
freedom of contract, provided that the contract is in the proper form.
In 1874 in the case of Riche v. The Ashbury Carriage Co.,6 Blackburn,
J., after citing the passage just quoted from the Case of Sutton's Hos-
pital, said :17
"This seems to me an express authority that at common law it is an
incident to a corporation to use its common seal for the purpose of
binding itself to anything to which a natural person could bind himself,
and to deal with its property as a natural person might deal with his
own. And further, that an attempt to forbid this on the part of the
King, even by express negative words, does not bind at law. Nor am
I aware of any authority in conflict with this case."
But it is clear that to allow corporations this great liberty of action
is not without its dangers. The logical result of allowing it is to give
them powers to do acts which may be wholly beyond or even contrary
to the purposes for which they were created. It was probably due to
these rules of law that, at the end of the seventeenth century, companies
were able to cite the opinion of eminent counsel to justify their acts in
carrying on trades or businesses or pursuing activities wholly outside
the scope of their charters, so that, for instance, a company for the
manufacture of hollow sword blades, proceeded to carry on a banking
business.68 It was probably also a perception of the inconveniences
which so unrestricted a power would give to corporation that has
induced eminent authorities to question the rule that a corporation may
freely alienate its real property.6 9 But in fact, though corporations had
these large powers at common law, the law has always provided some
measure of control over their exercise. To the consideration of the
or be impleaded, yet they may do all these things, for they are all necessarily
included in and .incident to the creation." Philips v. Bury (1694, K. B.) i Ld.
Raym. 5, 8; but this passage does not occur in Skinner's report of this case at
p. 482.
"These five powers" (see supra at p. 39o) "are inseparably incident to ....
every corporation aggregate." i Blackstone, Commentaries, *476.
"Grant, op. cit. 129 et seq. Brice, Ultra Vires (3d ed.) 74-8.
UBaroness Wenlock v. River Dee Co. (1887) L. P. 36 Ch. Div. 674, 685 n.
L. 1. 9 Exch. 224.
"Ibid. 263.
" See Holdsworth, op. cit. (I916) 28 SCOT. JURi,. REv. 336.
' See note 64 supra.
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form which this control has taken at different periods and in different
circumstances we must now turn.
(3) Limitations on the Powers and Capacities Incident to a Corpora-
tion. Just as all natural persons are subject to the common law, so,
from the earliest times the common law has enforced its rules on all
groups and communities of persons. We have seen that in the early
days of the common law this control had a considerable share in mould-
ing these various groups and communities through which the local
government of the country was carried on.70  Naturally it exercised the
same control over some of these groups when they became municipal
corporations. These corporations were simply the old borough com-
munities incorporated. 71 They could not be said to have any distinct
founder; and so they were said to be subject only to the "general and
common laws of the realm." 72 This expressed the historic truth as to
the form of control to which these corporations had been subject from
time immemorial. Taken in connection with the doctrine as to the wide
powers inseparably incident to a corporation, it in practice left these
corporate bodies an undue freedom which produced that state of mind
which is illustrated by the defence of the Cambridge common council-
man to the charge that the corporation had been selling pieces of the
corporation land to corporators at unduly low prices--"he thought that
the property (of the corporation) belonged bona fide to the corporation
and that they had a right to do what they pleased with their own. '73
In later law this rule was expressed in the unhistoric form that these
corporations, not being subject to any visitor, were subject to the visita-
tion of the king which was exercisable only in the court of King's
Bench. 74  And this rule was extended to all corporations; so that
a clause in letters patent subjecting a corporation to the visitation of
others was held in 1753 to be void.75
This somewhat unhistoric manner of stating the law was due to
the fact that ecclesiastical and eleemosynary corporations were always
subject to the control of a visitor. These were the earliest corpora-
tions; and, till the modern growth of trading corporations, they were
perhaps the most numerous and not the least inportant of corporations.
2 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 279-84, 335-6.
Maitland, Township and Borough, 19-2o.
"Philips v. Bury (1694, K. B.) i Ld. Raym. 5, 8, per Holt, C. 3.
T4 Municipal Corp. Report, 2199, cited Maitland, Township and Borough, 12.
"In general, the king being the sole founder of all civil corporations .... the
right of visitation .... results .... to the king. The king being thus constituted
by law the visitor of all civil corporations, the law has also appointed the place,
wherein he shall exercise this jurisdiction: which is the court of ing's bench;
where, and where only, all misbehaviours of this kind of corporations are enquired




During this period the law was well established that ecclesiastical, cor-
porations were liable to visitation by the bishop; and that, subject to
any other appointment by the founder, lay corporations of an elee-
mosynary type were subject to the visitation of the founder and his
heirs.76 The powers and duties of these visitors were settled, and put
,on their modem basis by the decision of Holt, C. J., in the case of
Phillips v. Bury in 1694:77
"The office of visitor by the common law is to judge according to
the statutes of the college, to expel or deprive upon just occasions, and
to hear appeals of course. And from him, and him only, the party
grieved ought to have redress; and in him the founder hath reposed so
entire confidence that he will administer justice impartially, that his
determinations are final, and examinable in no other Court whatsover."78
The control exercised by the visitor was supplemented by the control
which the Court of Chancery exercised, from the sixteenth century
onwards, over charitable trusts.79 In fact, whenever a trust could be
established, that Court could intervene to compel a corporation, as it
could compel an individual, to carry it out.80
But this control was only exercisable when a trust could be estab-
lished. And in the case of many corporations-municipal corporations
and trading corporations for instance-there was no trust to give rise
to the interference of the Court of Chancery. In fact none of these
methods of control were applicable to lay corporations of a non-elee-
mosynary type. This fact is illustrated by the provisions of the statute
of 143781 which gave justices of the peace control over ordinances made
by gilds and other similar bodies; and by the statute of 15022 which
required the consent of the chancellor, the treasurer, the chief justices
or judges of assize, or any three of them to ordinances made by crafts,
gilds, mysteries, or fraternities. But these statutes went a very little
way towards controlling the activities of these corporations. What was
wanted was a control which should ensure that they used their powers
in furtherance of the purposes for which they had been created.
Having regard to the doctrines as to the large powers incident to a
corporation, the construction of such a body of doctrine was not easy;
for, as we have seen, it seemed to follow from this doctrine, that
restrictive clauses in their charters, which purported with this object
to restrain their powers, would be void.
83
"' Case of Suttoni's Hospital (1613, K. B.) io Co. Rep. ia, 31a; Eden v. Foster
(1725, Ch.) 2 P. Wins. 325, 326; i Blackstone, Commentaries, *48o.
"I Ld. Raym. 5. " Ibid. 8.
' See Eden v. Foster, supra note 76.
' See Attorney General v. Foundling Hospital (793, Ch.) 2 Ves. Jr. 42.
15 Henry VI, c. 5. 3' i9 Henry VII, c. 7.
See supra, at p. 392; cf. Carden, op. Cit. 26 L. QuART. REv. at p. 324-6.
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We can see the remote origins of the method which will ultimately be
devised to deal with this difficulty in a dictum of Brian, C. J., in 1481.
"If," he said, "the king grants to the men of Islington that they shall
be discharged of toll, that is a good corporation for this purpose; but
it will not give them power to purchase, etc."8 4  Similarly in 1553 it
was said that, "if the queen at this day would grant land by her charter
to the .good men of Islington, without saying, to have to them, their
heirs, and successors, rendering a rent, this is a good corporation for
ever to this intent alone, and not to any other, ..... 85 At the time when
these statements were made it is probable that the idea that a corpora-
tion must have certain powers inseparably incident to it had not yet
been laid down so rigidly as it was laid down subsequently." We may
therefore regard the idea that the powers of a corporation were limited
by the purposes for which the corporation was created, as an idea which
was accepted by the law before the idea that certain powers were insep-
arably incident to a corporation became an accepted legal doctrine.
Historically, therefore, it can be maintained that the latter idea must be
understood subject to the former, and that the former idea consequently
qualifies the generality of the latter. The former idea was understood
to operate in this way by Rolle, who states it as a proposition which
qualifies the general proposition that when a corporation is created all
other incidents are tacitly annexed. 7  It followed, therefore, that,
though a corporation has a general power of contracting and of deal-
ing with property like a natural man which cannot be restrained by
royal charter, yet the fact that it is created for certain purposes will
limit its general powers and capacities, by avoiding acts done which are
not in furtherance of these purposes.
But, though the law was accepted in this sense in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, it rested on somewhat slender authority; it had
not as yet been appealed to to invalidate corporate acts; and, in view
of the much greater stress laid upon the doctrine of powers inseparably
incident to a corporation, it was largely ignored, and, as we can see
" "Si le Roy grant hominibus de Islington que ils seront discharges de toll, cest
bon corporacion a cest entent, mes nemy a purchaser etc." (1481) Y. B. 21 Edw.
IV, p. 59, pl. 28.
(1553, K. B.) i Dyer, Iooa.
See supra, at p. 392.
• "Quant un corporation est duement create touts auters incidents sont tacite
annexe. Come si le Roy fait un generall Corporation per un certein nosme, sans
ascun parolls de licence a purchaser terre, ou implede ou destre implede, uncore
le Corporation poet purchace, implede.ou d'estre implede assets bien, pur ceo que
per fesans del Corporation touts ceux necessarie incidents sont included. Mes le
Roy poet faire per special parolls: un limited Corporation ou un Corporation pour
un special purpose, come sil grant probis hominibus de Islington et successoribus
suis rendant rent; Ceo est un Corporation a render le rent al Roy et nemy autre-
ment," Rolle, Abr. tit. Corporations, G. 1-3.
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from the Parliamentary enquiry which followed upon the bursting of
the South Sea Bubble, even denied to be law.88 But the principle was
asserted and given somewhat of its modem importance on that occa-
sion; for it was clearly laid down that a corporation could not engage
in activities which were wholly foreign to the purposes for which they
had been incorporated. 0
This view of the capacities of corporations was also being reached by
a consideration of the limitations on the power incident to a municipal
corporation to make by-laws. The common law had long been accus-
tomed to supervise the law administered in the boroughs, and to
pronounce upon the reasonableness of their customs and by-laws.8 0
It is clear that during this period the court, in considering the validity
of these by-laws of boroughs, had begun to lay stress, not only on
their reasonableness, but also on the question whether these by-laws
came within the scope of the corporate powers. Thus in 1682,
in the case against the City of London, Sir Robert Sawyer, the Attor-
ney-General, speaking of municipal corporations, said:"'
"The limits and extents of their corporations and jurisdiction are
limited by their charters . . . the power of making by-laws, which is
incident to a corporation, is only for better government; and by that
rule they must be judged."
Substantially the same law was laid down by Holt, C. J., in 700 ;92
and, during the eighteenth century, it was held both in Chancery and
at common law that if a charter gave a corporation power to make
by-laws, it could only make them in the cases in which they were
enabled to make them by charter, "for such a power given by the
charter implies a negative that they shall not make by-laws in any other
cases." 3 "Corporations," said Yates J. in 1766, "cannot make by-laws
contrary to their constitution. If they do they act without authority."94
Thus the principle that the activities of corporations must be
restrained to the fulfilment of the purposes for which they were created
was made to limit the doctrine that certain powers were necessarily
incident to a corporation. That doctrine, as we have seen, has resulted
See Holdsworth, op. cit. 28 SCOT. JURID. RaV. 336-7, 341-2.
Ibid.
s02 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 283.
"(1682) 8 S. T. 1158-9.
92 "The corporation having power to make bye-laws for the well governing of
the city, that ought to be the touchstone, by which their bye-laws ought to be tried;
and if it be for their benefit, the bye-law will be good," City of London v. Vanacker
(700, K. B.) I Ld. Raym. 496, 498.
" Child v. Hudsonfs Bay Co. (1723, Ch.) 2 P. Wins. 207, 209, per Lord Maccles-
field.
'Rex v. Spencer (766, K. B.) 3 Burr. 1827, 1839.
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in giving to corporations a large freedom of action; but the growth of
this limiting principle has imposed upon it a necessary and salutary
restraint; and the growth in the number and variety of corporations, not
otherwise restrained, showed the courts at the end of the seventeenth
century that it was absolutely essential to insist upon it. We may say
therefore that corporations hold their powers and capacities subject to
what in later law will be known as the doctrine of ultra vires. The
germs both of the law as to the powers and capacities naturally incident
to a corporation, and of the supplementary doctrine of ultra vires have
been implicit in the law from an early period. Both began to be devel-
oped during this period and in the eighteenth century; but they were not
as yet highly developed. It will not be till the nineteenth century that
the d6ctrine of ultra vires will develop into a large body of complex
rules ;95 and then it will be in relation rather to new statutory corpora-
.tions than to these older common-law corporations. Even at the
beginning of the twentieth century the application of the doctrine to
the powers of these common-law corporations will give rise to some
legal problems to which the authorities give no very certain answer.9
We shall now see that these rules as to the extent of the powers of a
corporation have some bearing upon some of the modes in which a
corporation can be dissolved.
DISSOLUTION
I shall consider first the various modes in which a corporation may
be dissolved, and secondly the effect of dissolution on corporate rights
and liabilities.
(I) Modes of Dissolution. The modes of dissolving a corporation
which were recognized during this period were: first, the disappearance
of all its members or of an essential member; secondly, surrender by
the corporation of its charter; and thirdly, forfeiture.
(i) The view that, if all the members of a corporation disappeared,
the corporation came to an end was the best supported view in the
Middle Ages ;97 it was assumed to be correct by Coke;98 and it has,
therefore, become an accepted principle of the modem law as to com-
mon-law corporations."9 It is however by no means a self evident
rule ;100 and it was not the rule of Roman law.1 It seems also to have
" See Brice, Ultra Vires (3d ed.) 37.
See Carden, op. cit. 26 L. QuART. REv. 320.
3 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 37o, note I.
" If land holden of J. S. be given to an Abbot and his successors; in this case
if the Abbot and all the convent die, so that the body politick is dissolved, the
donor shall have again the land, and not the lord by escheat." Coke, Littleton,
*13b.
99I Blackstone, Commentaries, *485; Grant, oP. cit. 303.
' Salmond, Jurisprudence (2d ed. I9O7) 268.
'Dig. 3, 4, 7, 2; Girard, Droit Romain (3d ed. I9O3) 231.
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been accepted as a rule of law that if an integral part of a corporation
disappears, and there is no power in the others to replace him, the
corporation is dissolved. This was the view taken by Rolle in the
seventeenth century2 and seems to have been the view taken by Parker,
C. J., in 1712,' and by Comyn in his Digest.' So far was this carried
that it was held that, if a municipal corporation omitted to elect its
mayor on the right day, so that it lost all power to provide itself with
a head, the corporation was dissolved.5  This was remedied by an Act
of 1724;' and the fact that this Act was needed is good evidence that at
common law the loss of an integral part of the corporation without
power of replacement operated as a dissolution. The Act only
remedied one consequence of this doctrine in the case of one kind of
corporation. But we shall see that the dissolution of a corporation
entailed the very inconvenient consequence that all its rights and liabili-
ties disappeared.7 It was, therefore, obviously impolitic to allow cor-
porations to be dissolved by carelessness or accident; and so, in the
eighteenth century, the courts, in order to avoid this result, extended
the older cases which laid it down that acceptance of a new charter did
not destroy the old corporation," and recognized that the crown by a
new grant could revive an old corporation thus dissolved.9
(ii) During the whole of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the
effect of a surrender by a corporation of its possessions or its charter
was extremely doubtful. The fact that the law was doubtful is illus-
trated by the care which Henry VIII took to get the surrenders of the
monastic and chantry lands confirmed by Act of Parliament ;"o and, at
the end of the seventeenth century, the attack by Charles II and James
II on the charters of the municipal corporations, and the surrenders of
the charters which they procured, gave the law as to the effect of such
surrenders a political interest.
'Abr. tit. Corporation I. pl. i.
'Regina v. Ballivos (712, K. B.) x P. Wins. 207, 210-I1.
'Franchises (G. 4).
'Case of the Corporation of Banbury (1716, K. B.) io Mod. 346; 1 Blackstone,
Commentaries, *485.
a ii George I, c. 4.
' Infra, at p. 405.
'Haddock's Case (1681, K. B.) T. Raym. 435, 439; Mayor of Scarborough v.
Butler (1685, C. P.) 3 Lev. 237.
'Mayor of Colchester v. Seaber (1766, K. B.) 3 Burr. i866; Rex v. Pasnore
(1789, K. B.) 3 T. R. i99, 241; Grant, op. cit. 304-5, says: "There seems to be a
difficulty in reconciling the doctrine of dormancy, or dissolution for some
purposes only, with strict principles of corporation law; on the other hand,
however, the inconvenience of holding that a corporation in such circumstances is
wholly dissolved, so that their leases would be disturbed, and persons having debts
due to them from the corporation could not recover them .... is manifestly so
great, that the doctrine .... must probably be considered as almost established."
"o (539) 3 Henry VIII, c. I3; (545) 37 Henry VIII, c. 4.
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At the outset we must distinguish between a surrender by a corpora-
tion of its property and a surrender of its charter.
It seems to have been the opinion of Fitzherbert that a surrender by
a monastery of its lands did not extinguish the corporation; but Brooke
took the opposite view;11 and of his opinion were Popham, C. J., and the
court of Queen's Bench in the case of The Dean and Chapter of Norwich
in i59o. They held that "by the grant of all the possessions of a dean
and chapter their corporatioh is determined, inasmuch as they ought to
have a place for their assembling.' 2  But, according to Coke's report,
on a reference to Egerton, the two chief justices, and the chief baron,
it was held in 1598, in accordance with what would seem to have been
Fitzherbert's opinion, that, if the corporation had duties to perform,
which they could perform without possessions, the mere surrender of
their possessions did not dissolve the corporation ;13 and this is the view
which has prevailed. Thus Holt, C. J., pointed out in 1692 that a sur-
render of liberties and privileges did not dissolve a municipal cor-
poration, as it still had duties to fulfil, i. e. the government of the
town.14 If, on the other hand, the surrender of its property entailed the
total impossibility of carrying out the purpose for which the corporation
was created the surrender of the property might mean the dissolution of
the corporation.' 5
Right down to the Revolution the question of the effect of a sur-
render by a corporation of its charter was very uncertain. Two cases
of 156816 and I56917 reported by Dyer could be cited for the proposition
that a surrender of the charter would dissolve the corporation. The
first case is not very strong because the point \vas rather assumed than
decided, and there had been legislation confirming the surrender; but
in the second, four judges gave it as their deliberate opinion that a
"Labbe et touts les moygnes devie, le Corporation est dissolve, et le terre
eschetera, tamen 32 H. 8 per Fitzherbert, si ils vend tout les terres et labbey
uncore le corporation remayn, quaere de que il serra abbe, car la est nul
eglise ne monastarie, quaere si labbe devye si ils poyent eslire auter, le meason
estant dissolve, moigne et chanon sont capaces des spiritualities come destre vicar
executor et hujusmodi," Brooke, Abr. tit. Corporations pl. 78; the meaning of the
last sentence would seem to be that, the monastery being dissolved, the monks are
no longer dead persons in the law.
23 Dyer, 273b.
"Dean and Chapter of Norwich's Case (1598, Ch.) 3 Co. Rep. 73a; see at ff.
75a, 75b; followed by Hayward v. Fulcher (1628, K. B.) W. Jones, 166, 168.
"Rex v. The Mayor of London (1692, K. B.) 12 Mod. 17, 19.
" "He agreed, that if a corporation were made to a particular purpose, and they
devest themselves of all right, so that they cannot answer the end of their institu-
tion, it is thereby dissolved." Ibid. So Coke said: "There cannot be a warden of
a chapel, if the chapel and all the possessions be aliened .... because he cannot
be warden of nothing." (1598) 3 Co. Rep. at f. 75a.
" Walrond v. Pollard (1568, K. B.) 3 Dyer, 273a.
'Archbishop of Dublin v: Bruerton (1569, K. B.) 3 Dyer, 282b.
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surrender of its charter by a corporation dissolved it. But later the
current of opinion set the other way. In 1598 the inference drawn
from the case of 1568 was that the surrender "was not thought sure,
till the grant and surrender was established and confirmed by Act of
Parliament;18 and in 1628 Whitlock, J., differing from Jones, J., was'
strongly against the view that a corporation could dissolve itself by such
a surrender-a corporation which did such an act would, he said,
be "as it were a felo de se, which is against nature.""' Naturally these
different opinions were the subject of much argument in the proceed-
ings against the City of London in 1682 ;20 and, since many corporations
were induced to surrender their charters to James II and accept new
ones, the question of the effect of a surrender assumed and became a
question of political importance. That the law was very doubtful, and
that most of the judges could not wholly free themselves from their
political prepossessions, is clear from the opinions which they gave to
the House of Lords in 169o, when a bill for the restoration of corpora-
tions was before the House.2' Most of the judges held that a corpora-
tion could not surrender ;22 but Holt, C. J., followed by Eyre, J., held
that it could.
"Whether," he said, " a corporation may be legally surrendered is
a question that has lately been debated in Westminster Hall. I am of
opinion that a corporation may surrender, and thereby the corporation is
dissolved. I take it to be a franchise from the crown and may be sur-
rendered. It is a creature created by policy. Where is the harm if the
king consents and the corporation too? A corporation is made for
need; in times they are not fit."
23
Then, after citing the two cases reported by Dyer, he proceeded,
"Some say this (i. e. a corporation) is but a capacity. This is more;
this is an entity; they have power to act." As was geneially the case,
it is Holt's view that has prevailed ;24 but with this qualification that, if
the corporation is a corporation by prescription 25 or created under the
authority of an Act of Parliament,28 it cannot dissolve itself by the
surrender of its charter. In the first case it has no charter to surrender,
and in the second it does not derive its being from the charter.
(iii) That a corporation could be suspended or dissolved on pro-
'Dean and Chapter of Norutich's Case (i598, Ch.) 3 Co. Rep. 73a, 75b.
'Hayward v. Fulcher (1628, K. B.) Palmer, 491, 501; see a discussion of
these and other relevant authorities in (1682) 8 S. T. at pp. 1283-8.
'(168o) 8 S. T. at p. 111-3, per Treby arg.
Hist. MSS. Comm. i2th Rep. App. pt. vi. no. 208 at pp. 429-32.
See the views of Pollexfen, C. J., at pp. 429-3o.
"At p. 429.
"Butler v. Palmer (700, K. B.) I Salk. i9o; Grant, op. cit. 46.




-ceedings taken against it by the crown for misuse or abuse of its,
privileges was a very old principle of the common law. The
two methods used to effect this object were scire facias and quo
warranto; but for the old writ of quo warranto an information in the
nature of a quo warranto had been substituted.
2 7
As in the case of a surrender, so in the case of a forfeiture or
suspension of a corporation, the proceedings taken by Charles II
and James II against the municipal corporations occasioned much
dispute as to the possibility of forfeiture. Those who argued
for the City of London maintained the thesis that a corporation
could not be "discorporated" as the result of an information in the
nature of a quo warranto;2s and, after the Revolution, the same
judges who denied that a corporation could be dissolved by sur-
render maintained that it could not forfeit its existence, and the
judges who took the opposite view on the question of surrender
also took the opposite view on the question of forfeiture. 29 Here
too it is the view of the last named judges which has prevailed.8 0
And it has rightly prevailed for those reasons of public policy
which were successfully urged by the counsel who argued for the
Crown in the case against the City of London in 1682.s1 It is a
great hiatus in our modem company law, a hiatus which has re-
cently been the cause of considerable difficulty,3 2 that no such pro-
cedure is applicable to a limited company.33
Later cases have drawn a distinction as to when the proceedings
by scire facias and when the proceedings by quo warranto are
appropriate. It was laid down by Ashhurst, J., in 1789 as follows :s4
"A scire facias is proper when there is a legal existing body,
capable of acting,- but who have been guilty of an abuse of the
power entrusted to them; for as a delinquency is imputed to them,
they 6ught not to be condemned unheard; but that does not apply
to the case of a non-existing body. And a quo warranto is neces-
sary where there is a body corporate de facto, who take upon
themselves to act as a body corporate, but from some defect in
their constitution they cannot legally exercise the powers they affect
to use."
' The chief difference between the two seems to have been in the mesne process.
See Grant, op. cit. 298.
(1682) 8 S. T. at pp. 1115, 1245.
Hist. MSS. Comm. 13th Rep. App. pt. V. no. 269 pp. 72-3.
"Rex v. Mayor of London (1692, K. B.) 12 Mod. 17, 18; Grant, op. cit. 295;
cf. 8 Halsbury, Laws of England, 397-8, 400.
'" See supra, at p. 383. See infra, at p. 4o6.
' "There is no provision for extinguishing a registered company by any formal
application analogous to a scire facidas to repeal the charter of a chartered
company; it can only be extinguished by winding up on certain specified grounds."
5 Halsbury, Laws of England, 390.
"Rex v. Pasmore (1789, K. B.) 3 T. R. '99, 244-5.
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This seems to be the distinction recognised in modem law ;85 but it
may be doubted whether it was recognised in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries or earlier.36 There is no doubt that quo warranto pro-
ceedings were taken against existing corporations in Edward I's reign;
and these proceedings were taken against the City of London in I682.37
It is true that Treby, in his argument for the City, maintained that the
procedure adopted was impossible because it assumed that the City was
a corporation, and yet charged the City with having usurped the name
of a corporation ;88 and he cited a commonplace book of Hale for the
proposition that, if a quo warranto was brought for usurping the name
of a corporation, it must be brought against individuals, though it
might be against a corporation for usurping particular liberties to which
they were not entitled. 39 This distinction has not been upheld ;40 but
it may be that the arguments in the City of London Case, and the sub-
sequent discussions of that case, have had something to do with fixing
the modem law.
If judgment is given for the crown on a scire facias the charter is
repealed, and the corporation disappears.41 On a quo warranto the
crown, if successful, got judgment that the corporation be seized into
the king's hands. This does not necessarily dissolve, but may only
suspend the corporation. If the crown chooses to take advantage of the
seizure and does not restore its rights the corporation will be dissolved.
But he may restore its rights or revive them by a new charter, in
which case the result of the seizure will only be suspension; and this
in fact has been the usual course pursued in such cases. 42 We shall
now see that some of the effects of dissolution supply a very good rea-
son why the king should in such cases choose to revive the old corpora-
tion, rather than let it be dissolved, and create a wholly new corporation.
(2) The Effect of Dissolution on Corporate Rights and Liabilities.
At the close of the Middle Ages it was doubtful whether, on the disso-
lution of a corporation, its real property escheated, or whether it
reverted to the donor.43  There is no doubt that the former view is the
more logical; and there is reason to think that this view was taken in
I622.' 4 The latter view was probably, in origin at least, based upon
Grant, op. cit. 296; 8 Halsbury, Laws of England, 400.
Grant, op. cit. 296-8. I'T bid. 297-8.
"(1682) 8 S. T. at p. II6. "Ibid. IIi7.
Grant, op. cit. 298, citing Rex v. Ainery (788, K. B.) 2 T. R. 515, 547-9.
Grant, op. cit. 295.
42 Grznt op. cit. 295, 3oi; cf. (1682) 8 S. T. 1340-43.
43 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 37o, note I.
"In Johnson v. Norway (1622, C. P.) Winch, 37, Hobart, C. J., said that he
and the judges would consider whether the land escheated or reverted to the
founders; in the Hale MSS., cited in Hargrave's note 71 to Coke, Littleton *I3b,
it is said that it was finally determined that the land escheated. Gray, Perpetuities
(3d ed. 1915) 45-49.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the case where the corporation held land in frankalmoign of the donor,
in which case it would escheat to the donor.45 But there was a dis-
position in the sixteenth century to apply this rule to all the real
property of a corporation.48 Coke took this view both in his com-
mentary on Littleton,4 7 and in a case which he decided in 1613 ;48 and
he repeated or invented as the cause for the existence of the rule the
a priori reason that to all gifts of such property to corporations the
law annexed the condition of reverter to the donor.49 In this, as in
many other cases, Coke fixed the modem law. This rule of reverter
to the donqr was stated to be law by Lord Hardwicke in 174o ;50 Black-
stone repeated it, and added the new reason that, as a corporation can
have no heirs, a gift to a corporation was in effect a gift to it during
its life, and so was analogous to an estate for life ;51 and it has been
accepted by the writers of text books on corporation law,52 and applied
in a modem case.5 3 Clearly this reason and this analogy applied with
even greater force to the leasehold interests held by corporations; for
in these cases there was a tenure between them and the lessor. it was
assumed in the sixteenth century that a statute was required to prevent
the leasehold property of the dissolved monasteries reverting to the
donors.54 Blackstone stated the rule that they would revert, 55 and this
rule also has been applied in a modem case.5 8  The dissolution of a
corporation therefore causes the lease to terminate and to merge in the
lessor's estate.
The effect of the dissolution of a corporation on its chattels personal
was long unsettled. When Grant wrote in the middle of the nineteenth
century opinion was tending ifi the direction of allowing the Crown to
take these chattels as bona vacantia;5 7 and this would seem to be the
rule now accepted. 58  It may be that the acceptance of this rule was
43 Holdsworth, op. cit. 29.
S(1590) Moore, p. 283, pl. 435, cited Gray, op. cit. 49.
" Coke, Littleton, *13b.
'Dean and Canons of Windsor v. Webb (1613, C. P.) Godbolt, 211.
, Coke, Littleton, *i3b.
SAttorney General v. Gower (174o, K. B.) 9 Mod. 224, 226.
"The grant is indeed only during the life of the corporation; which may
endure forever; but, when that life is determined by the dissolution of the body
politic, the grantor takes it back by reversion, as in the case of every other grant
for life," i Blackstone, Commentaries, *484.
Grant, op. cit. 303.
'Re Woking Urban Council [1914, C. A.] i Ch. 300; cf. Hastings Corporation
v. Letton [i9o8] i K. B. 378, 387, per Phillimore, J.
See supra, at p. 4o0.
1 Blackstone, Commentaries, *484.
Hastings Corporation v. Letton, sapra note 53.
""The personal estate of a dissolved corporation seems to vest in the crown as
bona vacantia." Grant, op. cit. 304.
'Re Higginson and Dean [1899] i Q. B. 325, 333, per Wright, 3.; as he points
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due to a following of the analogy of the equitable rule that if chattels
real or personal are vested in a trustee on trusts which fail, they are
considered to be bona vacantia, and are therefore held by the trustee on
trust for the crown. Obviously the analogy between such a case, and
the case where chattels are held on trust for a corporation which has
been dissolved is close, and the same rule is applied. 59  This made it the
easier to apply the same rule to the chattels personal which the dissolved
corporation held in its own right.
From a very early date it was held that personal rights and liabilities
of a dissolved corporation disappeared. Thus rent charges and annui-
ties payable to and by them disappeared ;60 and a fortiori the same rule
applied to such purely personal rights as debts.6, It was probably these
inconvenient results which followed on a dissolution that induced the
courts to hold, wherever possible, that a new charter, given by the
crown to a corporation which had become extinct, operates as a revival,
so that the rights and liabilities of the old corporation remain.62  It is
for the same reason that the modem Company Acts make careful pro-
vision for the disposal of the Company's property, and for the satisfac-
tion of debts due by and to it, before it can be dissolved. The result is
that the law on the subject of the effect of dissolution on a corpora-
tion's proprietary position was and still is comparatively meagre.
THE NATURE OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY
The genius of Maitland has popularized in this country the con-.
tinental speculations on this topic. The question whether the per-
sonality of the corporation is fictitious or real is no doubt an interesting
philosophical speculation, and can easily be turned to political account in
countries in which, because the trust is unknown, a larger liberty of
incorporation is eagerly desired.6 3 But these speculations are for the
most part foreign to the province of the lawyer, 64 and, except so far as
such speculations and theories have helped to make our law, they are
equally foreign to the province of the legal historian. It will I think be
clear from the history of the incorporate person which I have just nar-
rated that English law has, at all periods of its history, been very lightly
touched by these speculations. No doubt in the Middle Ages, when the
idea of an incorporate person was new, and the law relating to it was
out at p. 331 this contention was made in the argument for the plaintiff in Corpora-
tion of Colchester v. Seaber (1766, K. B.) 3 Burr. 1866.
Re Higginson and Dean, supra note 58, at p. 329.
(I441) Y. B. 2o Henry VI, p. 7, pl. 17, per Paston and Newton, JJ.; Bishop
of Rochester's Case (1596, C. B.) Owen, 73; Grant, op. cit. 303.
'Edmunds v. Brown (1668; K. B.) i Lev. 237.
• See supra, at p. 403.
See supra, at p. 384.
This is well put in H. A. Smith, Law of Associations (1914) 128 et seq.
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comparatively meagre, the lawyers did occasionally indulge in specula-
tions of a crude and somewhat anthropomorphic kind, to help
themselves out of the difficulties which they were experiencing in dis-
tinguishing this new entity from the human persons who composed it,
or, more especially, from the human person who presided over it.65
They were hampered both by the novelty of the conception, and the
survival of older ideas dating from a time when this distinction had not
been clearly grasped. But, during this period, these causes of confu-
* sion were rapidly passing away. Such rules, for instance, as the rule
as to the incapacity of a corporation to act while it was without a head,
which historically can be traced back to a survival of some of these
older ideas, had been placed on a new basis logically consistent with the
separate existence of the incorporate person. No doubt the lawyers
still occasionally indulge in somewhat vague generalities as to the
invisibility, immorality, and other non-natural qualities of this new
entity. But they lay no great stress on them. They recognize that,
by reason of its nature, some activities which are possible to the natural
man are impossible to it; they are beginning to recognize that as a mat-
ter of public policy, its activities should be limited to the purposes for
which it was created; but, subject to these disqualifications, they have
equated it as far as possible with the natural men.
This idea that the corporation is to be treated as far as possible like
a natural man is the only theory about the personality of corporations
that the common law has ever possessed. It is a large and a vague idea,
but, on that very account, it is a flexible idea. It has made it possible'to
develop the law as to the powers and capacities of corporations accord-
ing to the needs and public policy of the day.66 It has made it possible
to discipline them, and render them liable criminally or civilly for their
wrongful acts in ways which are appropriate to the politic character of
their personality. And the fact that it has thus been possible to make
them liable for their wrongful acts has enabled the law to adhere firmly
to the central theory of corporation law that the corporation is an arti-
ficial entity quite distinct from its members. It has been found possible
to punish a corporation by dissolution or suspension of its existence; and
it is not the case, as the counsel for the City of London argued in 1682,
that a corporation cannot be punished, and that, if wrong is done, the
individual corporators are alone liable in their individual capacity.
In these last days the danger that an incapacity to deal with a corpora-
tion whose activities are mischievous will induce the courts to tamper
53 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 370, note I.
'A good illustration of the way the lawyers went to work to determine what
rules of law applicable to natural man should apply to corporations, can be seen
in the reasons of expediency advanced in Croft v. Howel (1578, K. B.) Plowden,
530, 538, for the view that corporations, though not named, are included in
Henry VII's Statute of Fines.
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with this central theory of corporation law is illustrated by the decision
of the House of Lords in the Daimler Case.6 7  This corporation being
a limited company, it was not possible to attack it, as it might have been
possible to attack a common-law corporation, on the ground that its
activities were in the circumstances contrary to public policy.6 And so
the House of Lords, with an eye to national defence, and in order to do
substantial justice, deliberately disregarded the distinction between
the corporation and its members, and ruled that, in time of war, the
character of its members might, for certain purposes, affect the char-
acter of the company. Foreigners might say that the corporation law
of a country in which such a decision is possible is as yet in a rudi-
mentary state, as it is clear that the distinction between the personality
of a corporation and that of its members is very lightly held. That
would not be perhaps a wholly fair criticism; for the decision was
largely due to the absence of any power in the crown to proceed against
a company, as it might possibly have proceeded against a common-law
corporation. 9 In fact the elastic theory of corporate personality which
the common law was developing and applying to common-law corpora-
tion during this period, was in theory adequate to deal with corporate
shortcomings. In practice it is true, it had its defects, as the Municipal
Corporations Report of 1833 was to show. 7' But the view that the
corporation was to be given, so far as was consistent with its artificial
nature and with the purposes for which it was created, the capacities
and liabilities of the natural man is probably as workable a theory of the
nature of corporate personality as can be devised,-provided that the
means of enforcing corporate liabilities civil or criminal are adequate,
and provided that the law is enforced with vigilance.
[1916, H. L.] 2 A. C. 307.
e, See Grant, op. cit. 42.
See Mr. McNair's very pertinent criticisms on this decision in his Essays upon
Some Legal Effects of War (1920) 117-120.
"' See supra, note 73, P. 394.
